

EMPEROR SHOWA THROUGHOUT JAPAN'S
STURM UND DRANG

—On the Record of His Majesty's SO-CALLED
Monologue discovered recently—

Heichiro Kitajima

Contents

Prefactory Remarks

I Emperor Showa and the Japanese People

His Majesty's Natural Man Declaration, January 1, 1946

Emperor Showa's Critical Time

The Tokyo War Crimes Trial

II The Contents of the Monologue

Volume I

Volume II

Wilhelm II's and Nicholas II's Peace Desires

III Emperor Showa's Peace Desire

総

American-Japanese Peace holding Negotiations, 1941

The Imperial Conference on September 6 (1941)

Criticism on the Draft of the so-called First American-Japanese Mutual Understanding Pact

艦

Prefatory Remarks

It was on the pages of the Japanese most popular magazine "Bungei Shunjuu", December issue, 1990 that the so-called Emperor Showa's Monologue was printed, which had been discovered by Mariko Terasaki Miller and her family about on the day of Christmas, 1989. It was found from among the relics of Lady Terasaki's late father Hidenari. At any rate this discovery was the truly sensational event to the Japanese, for Emperor Showa had been covered with the bamboo curtain so closely, even after His Majesty's Natural Man Declaration, as well as his preceding Emperors never disclosing themselves to the people at any time, so nobody in Japan believed that such Emperor's own records had existed at any place, and that His Majesty had expressed himself to somebodies else. The records existed, however, in which Emperor Showa had told various important matters concerning the Japanese war history from the Killing of Chang Tso-lin (the so-called some grave Manchurian Incident), June 4, 1928 to the end of World War II. Such disclosure as Emperor's Monologue had been made, in the form in which His Majesty told his will, mind and intention concerning those affairs mentioned above to

the five people including Hidenari Terasaki, father of Mariko Terasaki Miller,* from March to April 1946 in the Emperor's Imperial Office in His Majesty's Palace.

As to this discovery, the Editors of the Bungei Shunjuu say, "It is nothing other than super Japanese first class Documents! In the 'Emperor Showa's Monologue' the events which His Majesty had told, in his own words, concerning Showa history, were recorded in detail. —The figure of Emperor Showa which had been closed strictly to the public and disclosed indirectly some times only through his civilian adjutants' diaries or something alike etc., was first made appeared publicly, it can be said. It showed how had the Emperor been agonized, irritated, and endeavoring toward keeping peace through that dark age! We could not but tremble with sensation by pressure or historical facts when we read it carefully."**

A few people doubt the truthfulness of the Imperial Monologue. But almost all people who have read it through, don't suspect it, for what the Emperor told the five palace gentlemen were match for the historical facts of the age. It can not be denied that what have been supposed to be true at least through palace people's diaries such "Sokkin Nisshi" (imperial servant diary) as written by one of the above-mentioned Michio Kinoshita or other important documents have just been made true by being given an unmistakable evidence

* Yoshitami Matsudaira, Minister of Imperial Household, Yasumasa Matsudaira, Superintendent of Sochitsu Dormitory of Imperial Household, Michio Kinoshita, Senior Chamberlain, Shūichi Inada, Manager of Imperial Documents, and Hidenari Terasaki, Manager of Imperial Business.

** Bungei Shunjuu, Dec., 1990, p. 98. Goyōgakari Terasaki Hidenari's Nikki (Diary), Bungei Shunjuu Co., Ltd., 1991.

by the Imperial Monologue, on the contrary. It is said, however, that there are some ones who wonder if the disclosure of the Imperial Monologue to the public will influence badly or hurt the descendants or the relatives of the people who had taken some roles in the historical facts described in it, whom it treated in praise or accusation or despising. Except such deliberating ones as mentioned just above, all people including scholars and journalists are very delighted at its disclosure and its publication.

I Emperor Showa and the Japanese People

His Majesty's Natural Man Declaration, January 1, 1946

His Majesty's sole aim as the Emperor of Japan was to drive Japan through the days of the violent storm and turmoil safely and peacefully. The duration of His Majesty's reign had been 68 years in total, 24 years from 1921 to 1945 as Constitutional Monarch and 44 years as Symbolizing Natural Man Emperor, during which the Emperor was successful in achieving his purpose in part, keeping Japan united without breaking it up in such events for instance as civil war or coup d'etat or revolution, especially having Japan recovered completely from the almost ruined situation as the result of the defeat in the Pacific War under heavy bombardment including that of the atomic bombs. It was so great a job for the Emperor and his great contribution to the Japanese integration to have had encouraged the Japanese people to make exertions for the reconstruction of Japan which had been in almost ruins, for that purpose His

Majesty went around all over Japan immediately after the end of the War almost in train and on foot.*

Emperor Showa was not dictator or absolute monarch but constitutional monarch in the strict meaning of the word. His influential power was so great and his being so loved and respected by all the Japanese people those days, that his personal figure had covered all over Japan almost completely, with so long a history of the Imperial Household and its tradition in his back. There could not be any person, any hero or any figure to be comparable to or compete with him in the whole Japan in any field, such as politics, military, science, fine art, business or sports, and His Majesty was the same as before, in that respect, to the Japanese public even after the His Majesty's Natural Man Declaration on January 1, 1946 after the Japanese defeat in the Pacific War, which had, moreover, been unchanged until His Majesty's Demise on January 7, 1989.

The figure of Emperor Showa was so great as described above that he was able to dominate the whole Japan under his own great influence. But he had not been in such a sphere as an absolute monarch. The

* It, as a matter of fact, took him a long time, starting in 1945 to 1954 as an inspection tour and then until 1974 as just a journey in Japan. The people welcomed His Majesty heartily with a small paper Japanese flag in each hand everywhere His Majesty visited. Almost all the Japanese loved and respected His Majesty, leaving not a piece of evidence of despising or accusing him of his being defeated by foreign forces, which had been foreseen by the ex-Allied Countries including the United states. Showa Tennou (Emperor Showa, his whole troublesome life), Shin Jinbutsu Oraisha, 1990. Under such circumstances we could not but feel being agonized or ridiculed when we hear some one call His Majesty by only his natural name, Hirohito.

absolute monarchy was formed in such a way as the newly rising bourgeoisie came to intervene between a King and his nobles in order to get hegemony, so the balance of power was formed among them and king could dominate both classes for a while with great strong power, making use of it, because both classes needed to make alliance with king to suppress the other. This was in 17th century, so there was not such situation or state condition in Japan under Emperor Showa.*

Emperor Showa's Critical Time

Emperor Showa was not dictator either. He was the Hair Apparent to the Japanese Throne from the time of his being born at 10:10 on 29 April 1901 and he had been the Prince Regent of sick father Emperor Taisho from November 1921, his age of 20 years, until December 1926 when he became Emperor, succeeding

* Louis xiv's blunt proclamation: "In France the nation is not a separate body, it dwells entirely within the person of the King" or "L'Etat, C'est moi"(reign 1648-1715), a hundred years later, Louis xv expressed himself in almost identical terms: "The rights and interests of the Nation, which you dare to make into a body apart from the Monarch, are of necessity one with my own, and lie in my hands only." — The kings of the sixteenth century could not afford to go to war without the help of the bankers of Lyon —. The monarchy needs them, and pays generously for their services by mortgaging as much of the future national income as possible. They in their turn need the monarchy, since it affords them a great many opportunities for profitable deals, — farming the taxes of a wealthy region, provisioning the military and, less directly, speculation in stocks and property. It also affords them nobility, at least in the persons of their sons, who will become counts, marquises and parliamentary presidents while the old nobility wrangles over their daughters, frequents their brilliant eclectic salons and admits them to its own, when it has any. — The fact is that at these levels there is no longer any distinction of birth, caste, order or vanity. The Ancien Regime, French Society. 1600-1750, Pierre Goubert, trans. by Steve Cox, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., Copyright 1969 by Librairie Armand Colin, First Harper Torchbook edition, 1974.

Emperor Taisho, following his demise. Under such situation he had been the reputed existence through his whole life to his demise in Japan. As above-mentioned, he had been respected, loved and revered by the whole people of Japan except two cases in which attempted assassinations were made against him, one was on December 27, 1923 and another was on January 8, 1932.* In both cases the Cabinets at once presented their resignation to the Emperor, of which one was recognized but another was rejected by him, so that the latter extended its Cabinet life further though after its resorting its fortune to the general elections, fortunately successfully on Feb. 20, 1932. It was, however, at any rate, the Japanese circumstances around the Emperor that the attempted murders of the Emperor made the Japanese people persuade the Cabinets to present their resignation to His majesty at once, which showed how concentrated incessantly the attention of the whole Japan on the Emperor himself those days.

Under such circumstances the Emperor enjoyed his status as the absolute highest existence in Japan, so that it might be unnecessary for him to have any ambition to change the situation or condition surrounding

* One was attempted by a Japanese named Daisuke Nummba at the Toranomon Gate of Imperial Palace where the Emperor (Prince Regent at that time) had just passed to the Imperial Diet for its opening ceremony. D. Nummba fired at His Majesty's carriage with a stick gun, fortunately unsuccessfully. Another one was done by a heroic foreigner Independence Nationalist (He himself said to have been stirred up by nationalist group, however). He threw a hand-grenade at the Imperial Carriage, at the Imperial Sakuradamon Gate, just coming back from the Grand Military Parade at the Yoyogi Maneuvering Field. Tenno Hakusho (White Papers on the Emperor), Bungei Shunjuu Special Issue, 1956. Showa Tenno, op. cit.

能 him in any degree, which only meant the descending but never the ascending for him. This was shown more accurately in the Emperor's attitude to the 2.26 Affair, in which the Japanese younger army officers revolted, killing several highest ranking officials and cabinet ministers, in order to urge Emperor Showa to take more strong initiative in Japan politics those days (I'll touch the Affair later in a little more in details),* to which the Emperor rejected their demands completely in the situation in which the army generals and the whole Japan had been in the emarrassing turmoil without suggesting any concrete appropriate coping policy or decision to it because such a coup d'état-like affairs had never taken place in the long Japanese history until then, especially in the modern Japan. After four days, in which a kind of anarchy situation had brought in and the government lost its organizational and administrative function, the Emperor having decided to judge the so-called-Rising-Unit the Rebellion Army, so that the coup d'état like army younger officers' rebellion was brought to the end. What the rebellion was brought to the end comparatively easily after the four days purposeless violent commotion, had been solely due to the Emperor's intention and will, only on which the rebellious younger officers relied upon to change the 1936 Japanese

* Some 1,500 soldiers led by over 20 younger army officers attacked V.I.P. Ministers in the Okada Cabinet such as Lord High Minister, Grand Chamberlain and Chief in Military Education etc. on February 26, 1936 and killed four of them. Tokyo where the affair took place, had been under the martial law for three days and the rebellious army, having been surrounded by the legitimate army, surrendered on the fourth day. Two of the younger officers made their suicide and 19 were put to the death in the court-martial. Ni ten Nii roku Jiken Hiroku (The Secret Documents of the 2.26 Affair) 4 vols, Shogakkan, 1971.

situation just as the Decembrists of Russia did the same to Russian Tsar Nicholas I in December 1825.*

Emperor Showa, however, had no intention and will to change the Japanese politics in 1936 and also his status as Emperor just as what I have described as to it in the above. He had been content with the political and administrative state system surrounding him without any doubt on them, so that the Emperor had rejected the rebellion and ordered the government to suppress it with force without any consideration or compassion on it. We have to recognize here the Emperor's firm will to make Japan get through the days of the violent turmoil as safely and peacefully as possible, so that his sole intention was to keep the Japanese status quo (ante bellum) as firmly as possible.

The Tokyo War Crimes Trial

The Emperor's political aim those days was just as what was shown in the above, which was made certain in it also, but it was as to the internal affairs of Japan and the next problem here is what the Emperor's intention was externally or internationally, that is, to the foreign countries, which has to be made certain, moreover. It can be said that, however, it was the Emperor's sole purpose to have produced this "Emperor Showa's Monologue". The people who have had deep concern on the Monologue have said

* Toshiko Ikeda who had joined the rebellion as a second lieutenant and was sentenced to life imprisonment, says "Our failure was due to the Emperor's indignation. Japan state polity is Emperor's absolutism. We collapsed completely in front of His Majesty's will, whom we had devoted our life. We had no other way than to be obedient heartily to His Majesty's will in everything. This is Japan state polity. Bungei Shunjuu, May, 1988, p. 232.

皇 that it was made for the purpose of a polemic policy by His Majesty, toward the International Military Tribunal for Far East (The Tokyo War Crimes Trial).^{*} True or not, what The Emperor told in the Monologue was to show how he disliked or even had a hatred for the war and the national militaristic policy which was going toward the outbreak of the Pacific War those days. This is the reason why some people have asserted that the Monologue had been made to prepare to arrange for the opening of the Military Tribunal mentioned above and so it was made arranged in favour of him as his being such a personality and character as war-hatred and peace-loving.

The events which the Emperor had described in the Monologue, however, were not but matched those that had already been disclosed through the writings or records made by the people who played important roles in Japan politics or occupied the important posts near the Emperor^{**} those days, so that it must not be

^{*} In this Tribunal 11 countries participated, including USA, Britain, USSR, China (Republic), & France etc. It started on May 3, 1946 and ended on November 12, 1948 but its preparation had been made from August 8, 1945. The number of defendants in it, who were called A Class War Criminals was 28, very important cabinet and military leaders, of whom 7 people were sentenced to death by hanging and executed on December 23, 1948. Other minor war criminals were judged in the war courts in foreign countries. Its total number was 5,416 and death sentences 937. Tokyo Saiban, 3 vols, Asahi Group of the Military Court Journalists, Tokyo Saiban Publishing Association, 1964.

^{**} Sokkin Nisshi (An Entourage Diary), Senior Chamberlain Michio Kinoshita, Bungei Shunjuu Co., Ltd. (since now Bunshun). Seidan—Tennoo to Suzuki Kantaro — (His Majesty's Finish Resolution—The Emperor and Kantaro Suzuki), Kazutoshi Hando, Bunshun Co., Ltd., 1985. Jijicho no Kaisoo (Memoirs by Grand Chamberlain), Naonori Fujita, Dokuhakuroku no Gyakusetsu (Paradox of the Emperor's Monologue), Sumio Hatano, Shokun, Jan. 1991, Bunshun Co., Ltd. The Diary of Kido Koochi, Tokyo University Publishing Association, 1966, etc.

hastily judged to be as the Monologue was produced for the purpose to make it prepared for the polemic policy toward the Tokyo War Criminals Trial*, that is, the Emperor's attitude as to those events had already been made public to the world of Japan at least before the Monologue was exhibited. But there are, it is certain, a few facts among those events that has been made accurate in detail for the first time in the Monologue though their outline in some parts had already been published in history books or records as mentioned before.

II The Contents of the Monologue

The events which had been taken up by the Emperor in the Monologue were following:

Volume I

The killing of Chang Tso-lin by explosion, The London Naval Disarmament Conference, and the problem

* The Monologue had been produced in 4 days from March to April 1946, it is said. The denial of the calling of Emperor Showa up to the Far Eastern Military Court had been decided by Marshal MacArthur in a way of taking his name off from the War Criminals' list on 25 January 1946, Bungei Shunjuu, Dec. 1990. On May 18, 1946 it was decided publicly that Emperor Hirohito would not be put to the Military Trial and it had already been made public to the Military Court Prosecutors by their Head J.B. Keenan before it, Tokyo Saban towa Nanika (What is the Tokyo Trial?), Masaaki Tanaka, Nippon Kogyo Shinbunsha, 1983, pp. 247-250. The article of February 25, 1946 in the Sokkin Nisshi (above-mentioned). The retard of the start of the War Criminals Trial is due to the various arguments as to it in G.H.Q., they say. The Imperial questioning: Isn't it unnecessary for the Entourages to prepare some writings concerning the activities of the Emperor?, Bungei Shunjuu, Dec. 1990, pp. 98-99.

器 of the direct military appeal to the Emperor, The Shanghai Incident, The Emperor Organicism and Emperor-
 Personal-Gold theory, The February 26 Incident, The Sino-Japanese War of 1937 and the Japanese Triple
 Alliance, The Nomohan (Japanese pronounciation) Incident, The Affairs of the Abe Cabinet, Hiranuma
 and Germano-Japanese Alliance, On the Imperial Council, The Yonai Cabinet and the Army, The Japanese
 thrusting into the South French Indo China, The American-Japanese Negotiations, The Imperial Council on
 September 6, 1941, Kono'e's resignation and the Cabinet-Making by Tōjyō, The Decision on War, and The
 Intimate Telegram by President F.D. Roosevelt to the Emperor.

Volume II

The Imperial Paper of Declaration of War, The Imperial Envoy to the Vatican, Rejection to the issue of
 the Imperial Paper for the National Morale Rousing and the Imperial Worship at the Ise Shrine, The
 Causes to the Lost War, The Diplomacy by the Tōjyō Cabinet, The Domestic Politics of the Tōjyō Cabinet,
 What and Who were Tōjyō?, The Resignation of Premier Tōjyō, The Koiso Cabinet; (1) its Organizing,
 (2) Koiso's Personality, (3) the Appearance of Peace Proposals, (4) Prince Takamatsu's vicarious Worship
 at the Ise Shrine, (5) On Miū bin, (6) On the setting up of the Supreme Highest Staff, (7) the Resig-
 nation of Koiso, The Suzuki Cabinet; (1) The Senior Vassals Conference, for the selection of the Premier,
 (2) the selection of Foreign Minister, (3) and of War Minister, (4) the Causes to the Lost War in Okinawa,
 (5) the Imperial Determination for the restoration of the Peace, (6) the Imperial Council on June 8 and

the Item X, (7) the Negotiations with 'Soviet', (8) the Arguments as to the 'Potsdam' Declaration, (9) the Supre-War Council at the Midnight on August 9, (10) the Senior Vassals Conference on August 10, (11) the Royalty Council on the 12th, (12) the Imperial Council on August 14, and The Conclusion.

Thus the scope of the events which the Monologue had dealt with was so wide that we could see the Emperor's strong will in it in order to make his attitude to the age of Japan's Sturm und Drang clarifying to the world, whether or not it would be made use of by the Far Eastern Military Court. The Emperor's sole will was opposed against the War, which can be seen in all parts of the Monologue reading it through, which can be testified by other important documentary books or writings as told previously.

Wilhelm II's and Nicholas II's Peace Desires

A Chinese Precept says "To build a state may be rather easier but to defend it almost impossible." Generally speaking, successor kings or emperors are not fond of struggle of any kind and want to avoid war. A person who has occupied the highest supreme post would not or could not aspire to a higher one but only maintain it. It is rather famous that Nicholas II of Russia and Wilhelm II of Germany wanted to avoid the coming First World War and they had ascertained their such will to each other in their correspondence (the so-called Nicky-Willy one).

For instance, Nicholas II said to the Kaiser in his dispatch, in order to prevent the matters from their deteriorating toward the worse situation before the first World War; "You know that I have always stood

by a (good) understanding and that it was Aehrenthal who upset it by his adventurous policy. I now once more appeal to you in the strong hope that you may still withhold him from further fatal errors. — I am strongly convinced as well as you that Russia and Germany must be as closely united as possible and form a strong hold for the maintenance of peace and monarchical institutions. —”* And Their Majesties’ two Entourages, Chelius, the German Military Plenipotentiary at the Russian Court, and Prince Trubetzkoi, the Tsar’s entourage talked with each other about Their Majesties’ power of contribution to the prevention of the War immediately before its outbreak. The latter said “We have no love for the Serbs but they are our fellow Slavs and we cannot leave our brethren in the lurch when they are in tight place. — The return of your Kaiser has greatly reassured us, for we trust His Majesty and do not want war. — It would be well if the two Monarchs would have a word with each other by telegraph.”** We can find here the entourages’ strong reliance on Their Majesties’ willingness and power for maintaining peace over the World.

I here want to say that Emperor Showa’s intention to the coming Pacific War those days was quite the same as Their Majesties’ ones before the First World War though the ages and situations quite different in

* The Origins of the War of 1914, Luigi Albertini, trans. by I.M. Massey, Oxford, vol. one of 3 vols., 1952, p. 285, on 22 March 1909.

** The Origins of the War of 1914, op. cit., vol. two, pp. 491-92.

both cases of Wars. If say moreover, as to their efforts including the Emperor's one for preventing Wars those were completely brought to the failure* despite their sincerely pure desires and their full power endeavour. So I have to assert that Emperor Showa's will to prevent war cannot be denied wittingly and the facts of the matters included and deployed in the Monologue concerning his intention and effort to prevent war in order to maintain peace were quite as true as burning red fire. Another point in common for those three Emperors in those cases was what they all lost their Wars and their state status including the case of Russian Tsar who was overturned and put to death by the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 even though Russia had been a member of the Triple Entente, the Victorious side of the First World War. To our, including Emperor Showa's great happiness was that Emperor Showa could hold his status as Emperor of Japan until his demise in 1989 in spite of his being defeated in the War. It was, of course, completely due to the entente policy of the Allied countries including the United States basing on their perspicacious sight on the Japanese situation and moreover, on the goodness of Emperor Showa's to which we and the history of Japan must express a sense of gratitude heartily. The true intention of the Emperor's on making the Monologue, I presume, was on that point, that is, the Emperor wanted to bequeath his records in which

* *ibid.*, p. 574. There was such telegraph dispatched by Tsar to the Kaiser at 3 p.m. on 31 July 1914, "It is technically impossible to stop our military preparations which were obligatory owing to Austria's mobilization. We are far from wishing war. As long as the negotiations with Austria on Servia's account are taking place my troops shall not make any provocative action. I give you my solemn word for this."

他 had been peace lover and made exertions to keep it as much and long as possible. Two Emperors above-mentioned bequeathed in history their records on their peace loving desire in the days before the First World War, not to be less for Emperor Showa on that point ! It might be the true intention of the Emperor, I conjecture, whether or not he had been conscious of or making use of the Predecessors' instances.

III Emperor Showa's Peace Desire

American-Japanese Peace Holding Negotiations, 1941

Here we must proceed to the concrete facts in the Japanese history in the Monologue which the Emperor deployed through it in the wishfulness of his showing of the peace loving desire. As mentioned above, the historical facts included in the Monologue were so many in the number of the items and so wide in its scope, that it must be confined to a few items to be taken up here to my great regret though the whole items must be taken up and examined here, which, therefore, are expected to be appeared on my another poor thesis in some day in near future.

First I take up the problem of the American-Japanese negotiations, continued from February 14 to December 7, 1941, immediately before the outbreak of the Pacific War, about which, the Monologue says, the Emperor had not been made known in detail as to their measures and procedures. According to the Emperor there had been three time chances for securing the peace affirmatively through the negotiations

between the United States and Japan. The first opportunity was April (16th), the second June (21st) and the third November (26th, the presentation of the so-called Hull Notes to Japan) 1941. Among them, the Emperor, it seems, relied upon the first one vigorously in which the Draft American-Japanese Understanding Pact had been made, about which, however, to his great regret, the Emperor was not made known in detail in the course of the negotiations, the Monologue says. It was made by the collaboration among Japanese Ambassador at Washington Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura and his entourage, Colonel Hideo Iwakura (Military Section Chief of Japan War Ministry) on the Japanese side and two Roman Catholic clerics, Bishop James F. Walsh and Father James M. Drought on the American side.

The Draft included in it such articles as Making the Tripartite Pact powerless, the Withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory, Recognition of Manchukuo (Chinese Eastern Three Provinces), Pacification of the Pacific, No disposition of naval and aerial forces on it each other, Normal trade relations between both countries, Development of the Southwestern Pacific Area, Independence of Philippine, Removal of the strongholds in Hongkong and Singapore as British doorways to Far East, and the Conference between both delegations at Honolulu.* The Draft was refined by the hands of the Japanese side and it should have

* *Beikoku ni Tsukashite* (A Mission to the United States, Memoirs on the American-Japanese Negotiations), Kichisaburo Nomura, Iwanami Shoten, 1946. A History of United States Foreign Policy, Julius W. Pratt, 1959 fifth printing, Prentice-Hall, pp. 646-51.

been presented to Secretary of State Cordell Hull in the United States. But it was completely re-written by the hand of Japanese Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka who had concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940 and, moreover, a Neutrality Pact with Soviet Union on April 13, 1941. Y. Matsuoka believed that he could extend and bring such network of alliances which he had just made up into a wider one in which the Axis Powers should be brought into the good friendly relations with Soviet Union, which was just his reason to persuade the concerning people of the advantage of his choice of concluding the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy basing on the Germano-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, following the formation of Berlin-Rome Axis on the same year, a month earlier. Y. Matsuoka, the Japanese Plenipotentiary to the League of Nations at the time of Japanese withdrawal from it on account of the Sept. 18 Incident (Manchurian Incident) on March 27, 1933, became had in his mind the idea of the formation of four powers alliance among Japan, Germany, Italy and Soviet Union, most unexpected one at that time like a bolt from the blue which anybody else than Y. Matsuoka might not have conceived (in fact, the German 170 armed divisions with 30 divisions of her Allied Powers began to invade the Russian soil on June 22, 1941, only two months later than the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact between Japan and Soviet Union.)

Y. Matsuoka rejected the American-Japanese Draft Pact, making his considerations basing on the idea of the four powers alliance, especially at such points as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China, and

weakening of the effect of the Tripartite Pact and the denial or abandonment of the plan of the Japanese southward drive etc.* The Draft, therefore, was deformed into the general peace loving one from the concrete understanding agreement for both countries, giving up such articles above-mentioned as he disliked and the revised one was sent to the United States on May 11, 1941,** which, of course, had a danger to lead the American-Japanese Mutual Understanding to a naught. Although the negotiations themselves continued to December 7, 1941, it can not be denied, the main driving tide toward the completion of the American-Japanese Mutual Understanding had been put in the recession relentlessly since then. As regards that process the Monologue says,

"As the talking in the American-Japanese Negotiations has begun about at the time of the formation of the Tripartite Pact I have been made heard only about such characters as Catholic Clergics and Colonel Iwakuro but nothing more. At first it progressed satisfactorily but it was spoilt suddenly by Matsuoka's opposition to it at the important chance.

Matsuoka not only brought the American-Japanese Negotiations to a naught but also made Germany be furious by his conclusion of the Neutrality Pact with Soviet Union.

* Prince Fumimaro Konoë, Nobuyuki Tatenô, p. 222, Kodansha Co., Ltd., 1950.

** Kichisaburô Nomura, op. cit., pp. 35-36 (the body of the book), and 1-33 (the Appendix). Konoë Fumimaro, Teiji Yabe, vol. One 1951, vol. Two 1952, Konoë Fumimaro Denki Hensan Kankokai (Konoë's Biography Publishing Association), vol. Two, pp. 233-278. Konoë's true name is Ayamaro but the Konoës came to call it Fumimaro.

There had been three time chances for the American-Japanese Negotiations to be settled.

The first one was that of April 1941 when the United States offered it basing it on the Draft made by Ambassador Nomura, which was very favourable for Japan, so that the Army, the Navy and Konoé all expressed their consent to it but only Matsuoka opposed it because it was not his making one, and brought it to the failure. The second one was that of the consequences of the Konoé-Roosevelt negotiations,* which, I thought, would bring the matter to a success but its refusal came from American side in the last. The third one, though considerably unprofitable for Japan compared with the first, was presented by the Japanese side to American side, to which, however, the well-known 'Hull Ultimatum of 26 November' came to Japan, so that the hope for it was all shut."

This Imperial Opinion deployed in the Monologue was the analysis by the Emperor of the problem of the American-Japanese Negotiations in such way of his own judgement. The responsibility for its failure was put solely on the shoulders of Foreign Minister Y. Matsuoka in the Monologue, especially in the first Negotiations, which is in harmony with a general opinion as to that matter, deploring Y. Matsuoka's idea and actions regarding the matters as shown in various kinds of internal or diplomatic documents.**

* Bungei Shunjyu, December 1990 Issue, pp. 114-15. The conference between President F.D. Roosevelt and Prince Premier F. Konoé had often been planned but in vain.

** There are some people who speak in defence of Y. Matsuoka though almost all people denounce him as to his practice as Foreign Minister, Bungei Shunjyu, January 1991 Issue, A thorough analysis of the Emperor Showa's Monologue, Shokun, June Issue 1991, Matsuoka wa Baishtu saretake, "Was Y. Matsuoka truly bought over by America", BunShun Co., Ltd.

The Imperial Conference on September 6 (1941)

Following the above-mentioned matters the Monologue also shows how the Emperor intended and acted in defending the maintenance of the peace those days. It was that the Emperor rejected the so-called war planning paper that was brought by Chief in Naval Staff, Admiral O. Nagano before him, recognizing it as the Japanese aggressive battle plan against the United States, so that the Emperor asked Naval Minister K. Oikawa to make someone else take O Nagano's place as the Chief Naval Staff but in vain. The Emperor also objected to a draft plan that had been brought by Prince Premier F. Konoe before him on Sept. 5 in order to present it to the Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941, for, however, the items were unagreeable to the Emperor, firstly on making of the determination as to the coming war, the second, the duration of the American-Japanese Negotiations, and the third, making decision of opening the war against the United States if the Negotiations could not be brought to an agreement even in early in October, so that the Emperor asked Premier F. Konoe to change it into such one as to put priority on the American-Japanese Negotiations before anything else. To such demands as presented by the Emperor to Premier F. Konoe, however, he never agreed to the last.

Under the advice by Premier F. Konoe the Emperor talked with both Chiefs of the General Staff, General Hajime Sugiyama for the Army and above-mentioned Osami Nagano for the Navy about the military perspective in the American-Japanese relations in near future on September 5, 1941. When the Emperor

福 asked General H. Sugiyama for his foreknowledge on the military capacity and possibility to suppress the United States in case a war happened between the United States and Japan he told him that he could defeat the US Army within three months at most in the South Pacific area but the Emperor did not believe him and said to him, “You once promised me to get through with the China Incident within one month as War Minister at that time of its occurrence, I remember, but it has not been realized even today four years later than that,” to which he tried to answer with reason of the great width of China hinterland but the Emperor said to him again furiously, “With what a firm belief do you say three months as to the matter, the Pacific is much more wider than China hinterland, if say, the latter is great wide,” to which the General lost words with his head down.* This shows how irritated and annoyed the Emperor was toward the perspective of the coming American-Japanese war those days and wanted to avoid it, if possible, in his inmost heart, which, I want to assert, was not varied from those held by Emperors Wilhelm II and Nicholas II before the coming War.

The will of the Emperor’s peace-loving and avoiding-war has been exemplified in this article by mentioning these confined ones of those examples deployed in the Monologue. That intention of the Emperor’s peace-loving has become more famous after the Second World War by his showing the peace-loving WAKA poem made by his grandfather Emperor Meiji to the Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941, that is,

* Bungei Shunjuu, December 1990 Issue, pp.115-16.

All the Peoples over all World Oceans

Friends and Comrades !

Why Breakers, Storms so highly rising, Today ! Mutsubito.

which is now well known among the Japanese people and that deed of the Emperor, it is said, showed the Imperial Conference his very desire in favour of the peace toward the end of the serene age under the strained atmosphere on the day immediately before the outbreak of the War. It can be said that it testifies his burning desire holding peace as much as possible.

Criticism on the Draft of the so-called First American-Japanese Mutual Understanding Pact

The Draft of the so-called first American-Japanese Mutual Understanding Pact was not official but unofficial, for it had been made privately by such dubious characters as Tadao Ikawa and Colonel Takeo Iwakuro on the Japanese side and two Roman Catholic clerics, Bishop J.E. Walsh and Father J.M. Drought who were mentioned before, on the so-called American side. This presentation of the matter has been done so determinately by the first Japanese Ambassador at the United Nations Toshikazu Kase who had experience to have participated himself in the last phase of the American-Japanese Negotiations under Foreign Minister Hisanori Tōgō. The Draft, despite an irresponsible and scandalous literature, had been believed to be true and official by Ambassador K. Nomura nonchalantly and was presented to the Japanese Government for its urgent acceptance under the pretence that it was an official documents supported by American President

Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull, while Foreign Minister Y. Matsuoka was abroad, which was, in turn, easily trusted in by Prince Premier F. Konoe in Japan and the American-Japanese Negotiations was made started basing on that false documents, so that they, it was natural, would be brought to the failure in the last. According to T. Kase the deceitfulness of the Documents has been made clear to the public by both American and Japanese research attempts and testimonies.*

As to that problem an American thesis says as following, "The attempt to conciliate the United States began through unofficial channels. Two Roman Catholic clerics, Bishop James E. Walsh and Father James M. Drought, in Japan on business connected with the Maryknoll Mission, were asked to carry to Washington some surprisingly liberal proposals, which they understood came from Konoye. Japan, they were told, would nullify the Tripartite Pact, as far as the United States was concerned, and would recall her troops from China and restore China's territorial and political integrity. Discussion of Japan's economic problems would follow. On returning to the United States the two clerics secured a hearing with the President and Secretary of State, in whom their message aroused considerable interest, but actual negotiation was delayed until the arrival of a new Japanese ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. Discussions with him began rather promisingly in April, but the proposed Japanese concessions were gradually withdrawn or whittled

* Bungei Shunjuu, Jan. 1991, p. 114, Kase Toshikazu Kaisō Roku (The Memoirs by T. Kase, vol. 1 of two vols), Yamate Shobō, 1986, pp. 171-81. Kase Toshikazu, The Selected Works, 6 vols, 1983-84, Yamate Shobō.

away until they were unacceptable to the United States.”* This thesis made the contents of the so-called first American-Japanese Mutual Understanding Pact including such items as the nullifying of the Tripartite Pact, and the withdrawal of the Japanese troops from China etc. depend upon the Japanese, especially Konoye's initiative. That problem is, I believe, very difficult to make certain. And the thesis, moreover, continues to say as follows, “There is a good account of the Walsh-Drought episode and its sequel in W.L. Langer and S.F. Gleason, *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), pp. 314-315, 321 et passim). Presumably the disparity between the terms given unofficially to Walsh and Drought and those presented officially through Nomura represented the difference between the ideas respectively of Konoye and Matsuoka and the militaries.”**

It is absolutely necessary, I think, for making the question more clarifying, to examine it more in detail and carefully, which is, however, beyond my capacity and my preparation now to my great regret, so that I expect some one to reproach me in my way of approaching the question and to teach me on the matter sincerely. I for myself expect, however, to continue making research on this matter, that is, Emperor Showa's Monologue in its remaining parts and to take up it again in so near future.

*&**Julius W. Pratt, op. cit., p. 650, including its footnotes.

