

# A MEANING OF THE WASHINGTON NAVAL CONFERENCE TO JAPAN.

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## American-Japanese Relations.

The United States and Japan fought shoulder to shoulder on the same side in the First World War but the relations between both countries began rather to deteriorate since then. There were a lot of pending problems necessary to be solved between both countries. In the first place the fifth Item of the Twenty One Demands (January 1915, Japan presented them to the Chinese Government) read as following. Chinese Government should invite Japanese advisers to the matters of Chinese politics, military and finance, Military materials should be ordered to Japan by Chinese Government, Building of the Sino-Japanese joint arsenal under the guidance of the Japanese technicians. To this one the United States Secretary of State Bryan protested (11 May 1915), saying that

the United States cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking

.....between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy.

As the result under this protest, Japan shelved this fifth demand for a while but the serious thing was that Japan had never showed its will to abolish this demand eternally. The second one was the Ishii-Lansing Agreement, which stipulated that

the Governments of the United States and Japan recognize that

territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries and consequently the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has *special interests* in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.①

To this one American public opinion was very opposite though there was a secret protocol attached to it, saying that they (both governments) would not take advantage of the present conditions to seek special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly states. The recognition by America of the Japanese special interests was surely the setback of the United States in its diplomacy, so that the voice for seeking the abolition of the Ishii-Lansing Agreement was so high in America because the American people recognized the conclusion of the Agreement as a diplomatic failure for it.

The third problem was the one of Yap Island in the Caroline Islands. As the post-war dealing after the First World War Japan took three archipelagoes, Mariana Is., Marshall Is. and Caroline Is. as its mandated territories, to which President Wilson had been opposed, however, originally, because these three archipelagoes surrounded Island of Guam, American possession, in the form of their including it in the midst of them, and these archipelagoes would play the role of the thick curtain dividing the Hawaiian Islands and the Philip-pines. Finally Wilson gave up his opposition and consented to the Japanese mandatarly in the understanding that Japan would never make use of them as its exclusive spheres of influence but as its earnest mandate. Wilson had another important assertion, which was the problem of Yap Island, that is, the Island was the cable station located in the center of the three places such as Guam, Shanghai and Menado in Celebes, so that the President asserted that the Island should not be included in the Japanese Mandated territories but be internationalized in a more broad point of view. Despite Wilson's effort, his demand was not realized to his great regret. After him Secretary of State Huges had begun a campaign to deny the recognition of the whole Japanese Mandate system under the reason that the whole dealing with the old German territories was

not thought lawful without the American consent and its consent had to be one of the clear treaty form. This American Campaign was so serious because it did not ratify the peace treaties of the First World War. Its influences to the international politics was so great. The last problem was the one of the American-Japanese military thrust into Siberia. The Japanese military intervention in Siberia took place in 1920 under the pretext of relieving the Czechoslovakian army which had fought in Russia and after the truce of Brest Litovsk, still declared fighting against Germany and after the collapse of Tsarist Russia and Germany, fighting with the Russian white armies, from the chaotic situation in order to send them back to Europe via America, but the Japanese never expressed the intention to come back to Japan after attaining its original purpose and even though, moreover, the American troops came back to its own country. The United States, so began to persuade Japan to evacuate Siberia as soon as possible and was to continue to put the pressure on Japan until its complete evacuation from Siberia in October 1922 and Northern Sakhalin in 1925.

### American-Japanese Naval Building Race.

The United States, withdrew from the European post the War diplomacy, poured its full energy and willingness into the Pacific problems in order to establish its hegemony in the area. This was the one which would lead it to the clash with Imperial Japan in the end. There was big naval building race between America and Japan behind the problems mentioned above.

The American plan to build the big navy was as following. 1) to build 10 battleships, 2) 6 battlecruisers, and 3) 155 other warships in total. This was declared and passed the Congress in 1916 and 4 battleships, 4 cruisers, 4 battlecruisers, 20 destroyers and 31 submarines began to build at once but the United States itself joined in the First World War, so that it was impossible to build the remaining warships according to the plan because the U.S.A. had to indulged in the building small warships such as destroyers and submarines to fight against the German U-boats. The United States

naval building plan, however, was made to cope with the Japanese naval building plan which it had begun long before the First World War and was such as to build battleships 8, battlecruisers 8, light-cruisers 12, and destroyers 32 and others 51, that is, 113 in total (in 1921 the number of battleships and battlecruisers was reduced to the half of the original plan but this planning navy was called 8 (hachi) 8 (hachi) Fleet in Japan).

After the War, the United States began again to build the big navy under its plan and moreover, it made public the enlarged naval building plan which would be such a huge naval one as to cope with all the other naval powers connected at once. It was declared as the five year plan and it naturally astonished Britain, which felt threatened and begged President Wilson to stop its realization. Wilson had a problem at that time, which was to insert an article as to the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant of the League of Nations, so that the President needed to get cooperation from Lloyd George. It was under such circumstances that the President obeyed Lloyd George in his assertion and intended to stop the naval plan in order to get his consent to the insertion, which was a motive for the Washington Conference. In 1919 the U.S.A. moved the main part of its naval Fleet to the Pacific and Britain began to consider building its own Far Eastern Fleet (including 8 battleships and 8 battlecruisers) under such general armament increasing circumstances.<sup>②</sup> Besides this, Anglo-American competitive relations was not confined to this but there were such lot of them as trade relations in the world base after the collapse of Germany and as oil domination race between them over the Middle East, but there was motive between them to develop more the friendly Allied relations in the time of the First World War. In this case the big obstacle to developing the friendly relations between the U.S.A. and Britain was, of course, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which would force Britain to fight against the United States when American-Japanese war took place because the alliance obliged the contracting parties to go to help the other if it was challenged by the third power without its instigation. This clause was inserted in the alliance from the second Agreement in

1905 though the first alliance in 1902 gave the contracting countries such an obligation only as to keep neutrality in case of third power's invasion of one of them. This clause of the Alliance had already become problematical in the time of renewing the alliance in the third time in 1911, when it was decided between the contracting parties that the country which had an arbitration treaty with one of them, would be out of its application under the allusion of the Anglo-American endeavour of concluding such arbitration treaty. Under such circumstances the U.S.A. and Britain made exertions to make the neutrality treaty (Taft Treaty) but in vain in the end.<sup>®</sup> At that time, Canada, when the difficulty of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance seemed more increased, had become very active for the achievement of the friendship between the United States and Britain, that is, A. Meighen, Canadian Primeminister, opposed violently against the renewing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance expected in the same year as in June 1912, asserting its existence as a very obstacle to the Anglo-American friendship, which became a decision of the British Imperial Conference because the Canadian assertion was done in this one. Accordingly Britain had to be in the cross roads in the meaning of being forced to select Japan or the United States. This, under circumstances, became another motive for the opening of a general international conference for considering if the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should continue to exist or not. And moreover, it was a more great problem how to deal with the problem of the naval enlargement which was so painful for the countries from a viewpoint of their finance situation after the First World War. It was very easy for them to say but very difficult to put it in practice. So there was huge voice for seeking naval disarmament as well as the naval enlargement plan. This must be said to be very natural.

### Naval Disarmament Conference.

As expected, the American Congress in March 1921 was dissolved without any decision on the special budget for the naval enlargement. New Congress presented a request for holding of the naval disarmament conference, to the president. This request had

been presented to the Congress by Senator Borah and this was almost unanimously recognized by the Congress. Thus the naval enlargement plan was changed into the naval disarmament practice suddenly. The Conference was to include the Anglo-Japanese problem, the Far Eastern one in it, so that the number of the countries to be invited to it, increased to 9 such as France, Italy, Netherlands (having colonies in South-East Asia), Portugal (having Macao), Belgium (having concessions around Tientsin and as to railways) and China in addition to Britain and Japan, originally invited countries. The Conference was held in Washington from 11 November 1921 to 6 February 1922. 11 November is, of course, the Armistice Day of the First World War. Huges, Balfour, Briand and Tomosaburo Kato etc. joined in the Conference.

The U.S.A. led the others in the disarmament. The plan for it was also based on the American one. According to it, naval possession percentage was to be 5 for the U.S.A., 5 for Britain and 3 for Japan. The base of this percentage was the possession number of main warships (battleships and battlecruisers), including warships under construction by each country and this standard was most favour to the U.S.A. If the standard was to be one without including warships under construction, the possession number of the warships would be the most numerous in Britain, looking down the U.S.A. If the standard was to include the warships under only planning level, Japan would be almost the same as the U.S.A. in the warship possession number. The true intention of the U.S.A. for the opening of the naval disarmament conference, it must be said, was very clear here from the adoption of the American plan for disarmament standard. The naval possession percentage for France and Italy as to their main warships, was decided as 1.75 each. Each country joining the Conference was to achieve its main warship possession to the level of that percentage in compliance with the plan for ten years. In order to realize this plan, each country was to rectify its naval enlargement plan and to scrap various kinds of warships. The conditions for that purpose was as following. (1) Abstention of construction of main warships for ten

years, (2) All main warships under construction and almost all old main warships were to be scraped, (3) To begin replacement construction of the main warships for old ones ten years later. In this case the maximum tonnage for main warships would be at 35,000 ton and the caliber of equipped gun should not be beyond 16 inches. As the plan would be completed, each country's possession number and tonnage of main warships was to be as following.

The U.S.A.	Britain
15 vessels, 525,000 ton.	15 vessels, 525,000 ton
Japan	Italy and France each
9 vessels, 315,000 ton.	5 vessels, 175,000 ton

The restriction on auxiliary vessels was not taken up as a debate matter in the Conference but as to aircraft carrier, possession limitation for each country was decided there as following, 135,000 ton for the U.S.A. and Britain each, 81,000 ton for Japan and 60,000 ton for France and Italy each. Their maximum tonnage was also decided at 27,000 ton. The U.S.A. was allowed to change two battlecruisers, 33,000 ton each, into aircraft-carriers specially at that time, which were Saratoga and Lexington that became so famous in the Pacific War later. Nothing was not discussed and decided as to cruisers, destroyers and submarines in the Conference. It was to be noticed that France accepted its warship possession limitation on condition that there would be no restriction on auxiliary vessels and that Italy followed the example of France. As to cruisers, however, it was decided in the Conference that their maximum tonnage should be 10,000 ton and the largest caliber of their equipped guns, 8 inches.<sup>④</sup>

### The Pacific Fortifications.

The Washington Conference put restriction not only on the possession of warships but also on the keeping of the fortifications in the Pacific. It was decided in the Conference that the U.S.A. should not build fortifications on the Aleutian Is, Guam I, Wake I and Philippine Islands and other islands in the Pacific, except the

coastal area of the U.S.A., Alaska, Panama Canal zone and Hawaiian Is and Britain, Hongkong, and the Islands east of Long. 110 E in the Pacific, except Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This meant that the U.S.A. and Britain made a pledge not to fortify any place west of Hawaiian Islands and east of Singapore but in the meanwhile Japan was also prohibited to fortify the Kuril Is, Bonin Is, Amami Oshima, the Luchu Is, Formosa and the Pescadores (the Japanese Mandate in the South Western Pacific had already been prohibited to build any fortifications there, too), so that Japan, it may be said, was forced to fill up the outer defence moat with earth by this measure.

The Japanese opposition to the decision of the maintenance of 60 % warship possession rate in comparison to the U.S.A. and Britain's warship possession and this prohibition of fortifications on the Japanese main Islands, was so violent through the Japanese people, upper and lower, because Britain and the U.S.A.'s fortifications prohibition was put on the islands far from their main lands though these islands might be very important in the military aspect for the U.S.A. and Britain but in the case of Japan, the islands mentioned above as fortification prohibition area were so near main Japanese Islands or even part of it in the Japanese people's usual conception. It was mainly due to Japanese Plenipotentiary Tomosaburo Kato's ability and power to have suppressed the opposition and led the Japanese government to the conclusion of the Naval Disarmament Treaty. What T. Kato did in the Naval Conference in 1922, was absolutely right from a view point of Japan of 1945, the year of Japanese surrender to the Allied-Associated Powers. The pathetic wish of the plenipotentiary was that of no Japanese war against the U.S.A. and Britain, especially in the Pacific area, so it was not incompatible with the Japanese position in which it has been put since the surrender year.

T. Kato said as to this naval strategy not to fight with the U.S.A. as following.

National defence is not that of military monopoly. War is not performed only by soldiers' hands. War is not got through without

whole national cooperation under all national mobilization. Whatever strong military preparation or equipment could be achieved, if there is no development of national industrial power, no encouragement of trade, and no achievement of repletion of state power, there will be no chance for the whole national armament to make practical use, that is to say plainly, without money there is to be no war.

After the World War One and after Russia and Germany were destroyed down, there is only the U.S.A. that could have probability to make war on Japan. If we could achieve the almost parity armament with it, with only the same small amount of money as we spent in the time of the Russo-Japanese War in hand it is absolutely impossible for Japan to fight against the U.S.A. this time. How and where could we get such amount of money? There is no country other than the U.S.A. that could comply with the Japanese demand for loan. In case the U.S.A., such country as mentioned above, is an enemy of Japan, this way to get money is blocked, and Japan must make the money for military cost of itself. Without this determination of making the money of itself, it is impossible for Japan to begin war. There are Britain and France other than the U.S.A. in the world but Japan could not rely upon them solely. If I discuss the problem in this way, as a conclusion it is impossible for Japan to make the Japanese-American war without money, I must say.

It is very extreme to make such an analysis, so there will be some elasticity in the practical politics but if I discuss the problem extremely, the analysis must be led to such a conclusion. Here Japan must avoid the war with the U.S.A. in any way. If I discuss it again, the armament would not be made in any form without money. There is no other way for Japan to avert the American-Japanese war as much as possible and to wait for some other good chance. It must be the fundamental principle for the national defence under these circumstances, I believe, to make the adequate armament for the national defence according to the national real power and to develop the national power and to avoid the war by using all possible diplomatic measures. Accordingly, I conclude that

the national defence is not that of soldiers' monopoly.

To the American naval proposal, I thought, Japan must consent in the principle. What will happen, if the countries in the mention continue the naval armament race without any agreement on disarmament? Britain, surely having no power to enlarge its navy in great pace, however, will do something good as to it in the end. The U.S.A. its public opinion will be against the naval enlargement, has tremendous power to do anything it wishes when it thinks it necessary. In the case of Japan, the Hachi-Hachi (eight-eight) Fleet construction plan will be completed in 1927. The U.S.A.'s three year naval enlargement plan will be completed in 1924. To put aside Britain in this case. The U.S.A. will make surely some new naval enlargement plan without assuming any indifferent attitude on it for three years from 1924 to 1927, after it completed its naval enlargement plan, while Japan is engaged in its naval construction activity under its Eight-Eight naval plan. Japan must expect that the U.S.A. will make the new naval enlargement plan after the first naval one.

If it is so, Japan could do anything obstacle against the American new naval plan, however greatly it plans to enlarge its navy, at such a time as Japan feels big financial difficulty in the way of the completion of the Eight-Eight naval construction plan. It will be impossible for Japan to put even the replacement program for the Eight-Eight naval construction plan in practice after 1927, I think. Under such circumstances, there will be no diminishing but only increasing of naval power difference between the U.S.A. and Japan. Thus Japan is to be threatened violently by the U.S.A. Isn't it a very good policy for Japan to recognize the American proposed naval ratio, 10 to 6, of course it is very inadequate for Japanese navy, but if we suppose what will happen when the world naval disarmament fails to be achieved?⑤

However repeatedly we assert, T. Kato's thesis is absolutely right as the Japanese Pacific policy from a viewpoint of the post-war Japan. But at that time, it was very natural, such Japan as having been cherished by Great Britain as a copartner of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and as a gentleman's country in the Far East, as

having believed that it won over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War by its real power only, noticing no fact that it was under the thick protection of the Alliance mentioned above and the U.S.A. against Russia and as having looked down upon the Chinese three Eastern Provinces and Northern China as its near future spheres of influence after it expanded itself into Korea, Kirin Province, Kwantung leased Territory, Shantung Peninsular and Fukien, lacked such an obedient mood toward the U.S.A. and the Western world as what post-war Japan has. There was a powerful assertion in Japan that the keeping of 70 % navy to the U.S.A. navy and Britain's one each, was the least absolutely necessary amount to the Japanese national defence. Tomosaburo Kato was a beautiful red but unsettled flower blossomed in the diplomatic history of Japan. There appeared no one who succeeded him in his spirit and practice as to the Japanese Pacific policy and the American-Japanese relations. Washington naval disarmament was judged as a crisis and humiliation to Japan here at that time generally. This trend only dominated the whole Japan since then. American realism of diplomacy judged the Japanese one as 12 years boy's one after 1945 but at that time it lacked showing its generosity of treating Japan as such one. Only 10 % difference between 60 % and 70 %, was to be a big step to a decisive clash between both countries. This fact must be said to be a very unfortunate fact to them.

Japan, making its expansion in China very effective by its 21 Articles demands, and getting its stronghold in the Pacific by acquiring the Japanese mandate in the South Pacific, was to have a fate of being confined to the Western Pacific by the Washington Naval Disarmament Conference. According to some writer, U.S. Military Intelligence had broken the Japanese diplomatic codes and supplied the State Department with translations of confidential messages between Tokyo and the Japanese delegation. Hughes knew, therefore, just how far the Japanese would retreat. To see this phrase, we can not but feel the fight was finished here already in favour of the U.S.A.®

## Nine Power Treaty and Four Power Treaty.

The U.S.A.'s aim of the Washington Conference had become clear and clear and its great purpose was to restrict the Japanese activity in its expansion in China by making the countries respect the Chinese sovereignty and its territorial integrity. For that purpose, "the Nine Power Treaty on China" was concluded among the concerning countries, the U.S.A., Britain, Japan, Belgium, China, France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, on 6 February 1922. This treaty was aimed to put what the U.S.A. had asserted as to China in practice. The content of the Treaty was as following. 1) To respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of China. 2) establishment of secured and effective government of China. 3) Open Door Policy for business and industries of all countries in China. 4) To avoid any special privilege establishing in China. Concerning this Article the Treaty said, "To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States." 5) The contracting parties should not do any action to violate these principles or should not make their subjects or citizens do the same. 6) Not to seek for establishment of any spheres of influence or to develop any chance for exclusion of others in China. 7) The Chinese government should not give any country or any people any kind of discrimination concerning the Chinese matters. 8) China should keep neutrality in war in which it does not join and the contracting parties should respect the Chinese neutrality in the case.⑦

Before this Nine Power Treaty, the U.S.A., Britain, France and Japan had concluded "Four Power Treaty" concerning the Pacific Islands, under advocate of the U.S.A. This Treaty had the following as its content. 1) The Contracting parties respect mutually their interests on the lands or territories as the Pacific Islands. 2) and will hold the conference among them in case the disputes take place concerning them or 3) in case they were threatened or invaded

by the other countries. This content, of course, intended to establish collective security in the politics of the Pacific and restrict the exclusive or wanton activity by any one country® but another and more important purpose for making this Treaty was to produce the situation to exclude Japan from China. The abolition of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was decided among the contracting parties to be done at the same time as all ratifications of the Treaty would be finished. Thus the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was to finish its mission after its existence of 20 years. It can be said easily how greatly the Alliance had contributed to the development in China policy of Japan those days. It can be said also that 20 years of the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance were the most brilliant and ripening days for the Japanese Imperial diplomacy. The times were, of course, the days of the Imperial colonialism. Those days Japan, supporting a wing of the British expansionism in its world policy, was able to be very happy. But the things were not what they had been. The British Empire, and Imperial colonialism retreated in a big pace from the place they had occupied and the U.S.A. came to the stage as a new great power of anti-colonialism and Wilsonian 14 Principles. Naturally Japan was to be forced to change its Continental Policy for China and Pacific policy at once. The Washington Conference was a big signal-fire for the change. So long as Japan ratified these treaties, it understood the meaning of the new world order adequately and showed the attitude for its adaptation to it. It must have been expected so. But the unhappiness was to come after that. It came at once. Within ten years after that, Japan, changing it into a demon of invading of the China Continent, was to be criticized and reproached by all the world ferociously.

### Isolated Japan in the Far East.

The motive of the U.S.A. for its leading the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the abolition was to erase the fact that the hypothetical enemy of the Alliance would be the U.S. only after the defeat of Germany and the dissolution of Imperial Russia, and to suppress the Japanese invading activity under the disguising protection by the

Anglo-Japanese Alliance in China proper. Japan, having had been stripped of its invisible-working-cloak, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, by the hand of the U.S.A., was to be isolated in the Far East but the American hand of pursuing its control of Japan was never stopped there. And Japan came to give the consent to the evacuation of its troops from the Shantung Peninsular at Washington at the same time. "Thus in the Treaty as to Solution of the Pending Problems in Shantung area" the followings were decided, 1) Restitution by Japan of old German leased territory and all other public possessions in Kiaochow to China, 2) the evacuation of the Japanese troops, 3) Transference by Japan of the Tsingtao-Tsinan Railway to China and China should compensate Japan for it, 4) International or Sino-Japanese co-management of two branch lines of the Railway mentioned above and of the mining enterprises, and 5) Japan should not set any foreign settlement there since then.<sup>⑥</sup> By this Treaty Japan carried out the promise that it would recover the Shantung sovereignty to China, which Japan made to President Wilson in 1919. Next the Japanese delegation declared to the Conference that Japan would abolish the fifth item of the 21 Articles Demands to China. And moreover, Plenipotentiary Kijiyuro Shidehara made the promise that Japan would evacuate Siberia which was a long-pending question to the Western world especially to the U.S.A. and Japan performed it in October 1922. But the evacuation of the Japanese troops from Northern Sakhalin did not take place until April 1925.<sup>⑦</sup> Lansing-Ishii Agreement was little more than a mere name, now that all things have had come to this pass. Although Japan still stuck to it but under these circumstances it broke the Agreement in April 1923 at last. Thus Japan lost all American recognition, such as Katsura-Taft Agreement, Root Takahira Agreement as well as Lansing-Ishii Agreement, on its continental expansion policy in China at that time. Japan still had various kinds of Chinese concessions to it, including Liaotung Peninsular Leased Territory, Southern Part of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the economic concessions and interests of the 21 Articles Demands and several settlements. But a country backing these concessions, Tsarist Russia had already disap-

peared and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, another its supporter, had also been brought to naught. Japan had to recognize these facts coolly, which was an absolutely right walking way for Japan together with its keeping T. Kato's naval policy, especially from a viewpoint of Japan after 1945.

The U.S.A.'s earnest desire for solving the pending problems in the Pacific in its favour, however, was still so violent. It got the following promises from Japan as to them by the Pact of February 11, 1922. Concerning the cable and radio communications in Yap Island, 1) Unrestricted comings and goings between the Island and the U.S.A., 2) Establishment of living and property prerogatives for American citizens on it, 3) No Japanese examination of the Yap communications and no tax on the organization. The U.S.A., however, recognized the existence of the Japanese Mandate on the South Pacific Islands by the Pact but on the following conditions, 1) Unrestricted application of the present American-Japanese Commercial Agreement in the necessity, respect of American property rights and unrestricted missionary activity on the Mandated Islands, 2) No militarization and no fortifications on the Mandated area, 3) Japanese sending a copy of the Mandate Report to the League of Nations Committee also to the U.S.A.'s authority.<sup>⑩</sup>

### The Washington Order.

The U.S.A. got, by the success of the Washington Conference, a great step to its establishment of the hegemony in the Pacific. It boasted of its getting the following political effectiveness only by the sacrifice of the abolishment of 28 old warships and of the paper planned but not yet built warships; Control of Japan, Preservation of the Chinese sovereignty and integrity, Erasing of the British naval supremacy (British giving up of its principle of maintaining two power standard navy) and Security of the Yap. As to the Four Power Pact, the U.S. Senate, moreover, added such reservations concerning the meaning of the item "Consultation" expressed in the Treaty, as it does not mean any use of military weapon, conclusion of any kind of alliance and obligation of any joining in even defen-

sive war. The American self-praise was, of course, very natural from the viewpoint of the matters mentioned above. But it cannot be denied that Japan was obliged to get the very threatening crisis feeling from the result of the Conference. Japan was forced to fall into the Washington Order from the high proudish stage of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by one step, just like a man got through the time tunnel by one jump, which gave naturally the general Japanese people as well as the ultra expansionists a danger sense as to the Japanese future fate. The Japanese Navy, restricted in the sphere of the amount of battleships, began the high quality training of the sailors through the so-called Monday, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Friday training plan, that is, no Saturday and Sunday in a training week, concentrating all soul and spirit on the development of warriors quality which can supplement the lack of the adequate amount of warships and naval equipment, and changing the expected enemy no. 1 for Japan from Russia to the U.S.A. since then. Although the U.S.A. says that it could get this remarkable success in the sacrifice of only the old warships and the paper plan ones which was thought impossible to get through the Congress to be real ones as described above, the crisis feeling that put in the bottom of the Japanese society by it, was to break up into the Pacific War only 20 years later. That mistake was solely due to the Japanese ultra-expansionist movement intending to support its China policy but it may be said that the U.S.A. that pushed forcibly the solution of the 1922 on Japan, the victor of the First World War, without any other consideration, must have had some bad feeling just like that to be felt after sudden getting up, on the problem.

#### Notes ;

- ① Julius W. Pratt, *A History of United States Foreign Policy* (Prentice Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1959, fifth printing), p. 541.
- ② Ichirō Satō, *Kaigun Gojyūnen Shi* (50 year History of the Japanese Navy), Masu Shobō, Shōwa 18 nen, pp. 225-60. Kiyoshi Ikeda, *Nippon no Kaigun* (Japanese Navy), Shisei Dō, Tokyo, Shōwa 43 nen, pp. 38-39.
- ③ Nippon Gaimushō, *Nippon Gaikō Nenpyō narabini Shuyō Bunshō* (Chronological Table of Japan Diplomacy and Its Main Documents), vol. One, pp.

203-205, and 237-38, and 351-52.

- ④ Ibid., vol. Two, pp. 9-12, I. Satō, op. cit., pp. 255-81.
- ⑤ K. Ikeda, op. cit., pp. 55-57.
- ⑥ J. Pratt, op. cit., p. 548.
- ⑦ Nippon Gaimushō, op. cit., vol. Two, pp. 15-19.
- ⑧ The Major International Treaties, 1914-1973, by J.A.S. Grenville (Methuen & Co Ltd., Great Britain, 1974), pp. 91-92.
- ⑨ Nippon Gaimushō, op. cit., vol. Two, pp. 3-8.
- ⑩ Ibid., pp. 23-24.
- ⑪ Ibid., pp. 19-21.